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The German philosopher, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, 
wrote his first philosophical work at the tender age of 
seventeen and died at the age of seventy. Leibniz was 
able to write much in terms of both quantity and quality. 
His ideas were on significant and difficult subjects, 
ranging from philosophy, to mathematics, to physics, and 
engineering. Because he wrote so much and over such a 
very long period of time, there is much to be reconciled 
and understood in Leibniz’s philosophy. A sort of 
rectification should take place, a cohesion of thought 
between his seemingly disparate ideas. I will present one 
such tension in Leibniz’s philosophical writings that 
requires said careful attention. The tension comes via 
Leibniz’s thoughts on the individual and freedom. 
     Leibniz believes the individual to be properly 
understood in the context of what he calls its complete 
concept. The complete individual concept stems from 
Leibniz’s adherence to two different principles. The 
predicate in subject principle, which asserts that 
predicates are found within the subject. This means that 
the subject determines the predicates it will have based 
on its simply being. This principle in turn relies upon the 
second principle of sufficient reason. The principle of 
sufficient reason states that everything that exists must 
have sufficient reason for doing so. One must be able to 
answer the question of why something is the way it is as 
opposed to some other way. If the predicate in subject 
principle is connected with the principle of sufficient 
reason and applied to individuals then the result is the 
complete individual concept. 
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     This concept, which constitutes the individual, contains 
everything: everything that has happened, that will 
happen, and that is happening. An individual’s properties 
are found in the concept that constitutes the individual, 
(predicate in subject principle), and are rationally deduced 
from said concept (principal of sufficient reason). 
 To illustrate this, Leibniz in “On Contingency” 
states: “It is certain that there is a connection between 
subject and predicate in every truth. Therefore, when one 
says, ‘Adam who sins exists,’ it is necessary that there be 
something in this possible notion, ‘Adam who sins,’ by 
virtue of which he is said to exist.”1 The subject, Adam, 
contains within his complete concept the 
predicate of sinning. Sinning is therefore a part of Adam’s 
identity, a part of what it means to be Adam. In changing 
one of the deducible properties, i.e. sinning, this means 
you would have to change all of the properties that come 
to be deduced from that property and you would be 
altering the process of reasoning that occurred to produce 
that property in the first place. Before, you had a logical 
deduction of properties guided by the principle of 
sufficient reason. Now that you have a new property, a 
different set of deductions must take place in order for 
that new property to become manifest, a process that 
involves the entirety of the complete concept. 
     This leads to a universe wherein everything is 
connected, in one way or another. Leibniz waxes poetic 
when he says that each person is a mirror which 
represents the universe from their own unique 
perspective. He also states, “The present is pregnant with 
the future; the future can be read in the past; the distant is 
expressed in the proximate.”2 Thus, the complete concept 
of an individual will include a unique mirroring of an 
                                                        
1 G.W. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber. 
(Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), 29. 
2 Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, 211 




interconnected universe with all of its past and future 
states. 
     The super-essentialist reading of Leibniz that I will be 
arguing against latches onto this idea that all of the 
predicates are found within the complete individual 
concept. They assert that if one were somehow able to 
change even one of the properties found in an individual’s 
complete concept, then the very essence of that 
individual would change. To cast a wide net over the 
whole of Leibnizean scholarship, this has come to be the 
prevailing view. The thesis of this essay is that this 
prevailing view has misunderstood certain parts of 
Leibniz’s philosophy and has been uncharitable to others, 
declaring that Leibniz was not entitled to the things he 
said on freedom. 
     I shall first dive into the position that I am arguing 
against. I will be using Fabrizio Mondadori and the ideas 
that he has expressed in his essay titled Leibniz and the 
Doctrine of Interworld Identity as representative of the 
super-essentialist position. Mondadori writes: 
 
“[T]he complete concept exemplified by a given individual 
is nothing other than the latter’s nature or essence. This, 
in conjunction with Leibniz’s claim that from a given 
complete concept one can somehow deduce all of the 
properties of the individual exemplifying it, leads to what I 
have called “super-essentialism”: the view, namely, that 
all of a given individual’s properties are essential to him.”3 
 
This simple explanation gets complicated, however, when 
Mondadori dives further into the complete concept theory 
for individuals. He asserts that the complete concept is 
not to be considered a set of all the properties that the 
                                                        
3 Fabrizio Mondadori, “Leibniz and the Doctrine of Inter-world Identity.” 
Studia Leibnitiana Bd.7, H. 1 (1975): 31, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40693759 
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individual expresses, but rather as a core set of properties 
from which all of the other properties will be deduced. 
Mondadori argues that this core set of properties makes 
up the essence of the individual, for in these two separate 
passages he states: 
 
“Leibniz definitely rejected the view that a complete 
concept is made up of all of the properties possessed by 
the individual exemplifying it. His view, rather, was that a 
complete concept is to be identified with a core set of 
properties … from which all of the (remaining) properties 
of the individual in question can somehow be deduced.”4 
 
“This core set of properties, I have argued, is according to 
Leibniz one and the same thing as the nature or essence 
of the individual exemplifying it in the actual world.”5 
 
Mondadori continues on to try and show that Leibniz 
himself believed that if one property were to be changed 
then the same individual would not persist through such 
an alteration. This, Mondadori believes, is due to the 
rational deduction that occurs, tying in the principle of 
sufficient reason. Changing one of the deducible 
properties would alter all of the properties that came to 
be deduced from that property and would disturb the 
process of reasonable relationships that inevitably lead to 
the manifestation of that property in the first place. Thus, 
one would be changing the core properties in order to 
produce this new property, and so, the essence of the 
individual will have changed. If the essence of the 
individual changes, then you no longer have the same 
individual. Mondadori concludes the section saying, “In a 
word: change one of the ‘consequences’ of the concept, 
                                                        
4 Mondadori, “Doctrine of Inter-world Identity,” 22. 
5 Mondadori, “Doctrine of Inter-world Identity,” 23. 




and you have to change the concept itself; but if you 
change the concept then … you will end up with a 
different individual than the individual who exemplified 
the original concept.”6 
 
Freedom 
Directly tied into this debate is Leibniz’s conception of 
freedom for the individual. If actions undertaken are to be 
considered properties of an individual, and if all of an 
individual’s properties are essential to that individual i.e. 
nothing can be other than what it is, then in what sense 
does the individual have freedom? 
     Leibniz believes freedom to be found in the realm of 
possibility or rather in the fact that things could have been 
otherwise. This is what pulls him back from the precipice 
of determinism. This ‘possibility’ exists in the mind of 
God, where before creation, God surveyed the infinite 
possibilities of different instantiations of worlds and 
individuals. The super-essentialist denies  this possibility 
of inter-world identity however, for they say that 
individuals are world bound and that although there may 
be possibility with regards to different worlds, there is no 
possibility of having individuals cross over between these 
different worlds. There are no infinitely many structures 
that become increasingly complex as God decides which 
combinations of different simple forms should be put 
together. They believe that there is only one individual 
that has specific predicates that are directly derived from 
their core properties. This individual cannot increase or 
decrease in complexity, gain or lose predicates. Therefore, 
super-essentialism is the groundwork upon which inter-
world identity is denied and world-bound individuals are 
posited. So, if I am to assert that inter-world identity is 
possible within the philosophical framework of Leibniz, 
then it is this interpretation of Leibniz by Mondadori that I 
                                                        
6 Mondadori, “Doctrine of Inter-world Identity,” 24-25. 
      MUSe    Vol. 3(1)                          May 2017                        
176 
 
must overcome. The difficult part is that in denying the 
super-essentialist interpretation I seem to have to deny 
Leibniz’s predicate in subject principle. If I want to assert 
that there is a degree of spontaneity that can occur within 
the confines of Leibnizean philosophy, then it seems that I 
have to reject the idea that the predicate of ‘sinning’ 
adheres logically or rationally to the subject of Adam. 
 
Core Properties 
And so, in order to assert inter-world identity without 
rejecting Leibniz’s predicate in subject principle I shall 
look to the core properties. I shall show that the core 
properties can be separated from the deducible properties 
because the core properties are what constitute the 
individual essentially. In opposition, for super-essentialism 
to stand, it must show that both the core properties and 
the deducible properties are essential. Mondadori is 
frustratingly vague about the distinction between core 
properties and deducible properties, but the answer 
seems to reveal itself in section five where he discusses 
essences and accidents. 
     I shall now quote Mondadori here at length: 
 
“[A]n essential property is according to Leibniz one which 
is somehow associated with the species to which the 
individual possessing it belongs (thus, for example, being 
a member of the species homo sapiens is one such 
property), or else one which in some sense “follows” from 
a property of the former type (thus, for example, being 
capable of thought is according to Leibniz one such 
property).”7 
 
So one’s core properties are only those properties which 
are necessary; properties that are identical in the sense of 
                                                        
7 Mondadori, “Doctrine of Inter-world Identity,” 50. 




A=A. Mondadori is saying that the core properties must 
denote that which is essential to our understanding of the 
individual and vice versa. But what does Leibniz have to 
say about these core properties? I will now quote Leibniz 
in his correspondence with Arnauld. He writes, “[I]n 
speaking of several Adams I do not take Adam for a 
determined individual but for a certain person conceived 
sub ratione generalitatis under the circumstances which 
appear to us to determine Adam as an individual but 
which do not actually determine him sufficiently.”8 Here 
Leibniz is describing an individual as a general 
understanding of that individual; enough to differentiate 
the individual from others, but not enough to determine 
the individual in its fullest sense, as in, with the type of 
complete concept found in the created world. This is 
exactly the type of individual that is required for inter-
world identity: where the the core properties are enough 
to define an individual, but which are not so specific as to 
completely determine the individual. The essential, core 
properties are those that allow Leibniz to conceive of a 
person generally, whereas the derived properties are 
those that come about in the actual Adam, not in the 
infinity of possible Adams. 
 
Laws and Complete Concepts 
But, if I am correct in my assertion that inter-world 
identity is possible, then I cannot just show that there is a 
qualitative difference between core and derivable 
properties, I must also rectify the notion that the laws of 
any given possible world are essential to that individual’s 
essence. For if the specific laws of a single possible world 
are essential to the essence of an individual, then my 
argument for inter-world identity falls apart because the 
                                                        
8 G.W. Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, Correspondence with 
Arnauld, Monadology, trans. George Montgomery (La Salle, Illinois: 
Open Court Publishing Company, 1997), 128-129. 
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laws determine what properties are derived from the core 
properties. The laws determine the derived properties, so 
if the laws are essential to the individual, then they bring 
into the essentialness of the individual the derived 
properties as well. I shall argue that it is only after the 
individual has been realized in the actualized world that 
the laws of that world may enter into the complete 
individual concept. 
     Unsurprisingly, Mondadori resists the idea that the laws 
of a world are not tied up with the essence of the 
individual. 
 
“[T]he laws must therefore be (partly) constitutive of the 
essence or nature of the given individual. Or more 
generally: the laws must be (partly) constitutive of the 
essence or nature (i.e. concept) of the world to which that 
individual belongs, and hence also of the essence or 
nature of the individual in question (since for Leibniz a 




I ultimately agree that the laws of a particular world are 
inherently tied up with the individual of said world, for it is 
the laws of the world that help to determine the 
properties that will be deduced from the core set of 
properties. Therefore, in one sense, the laws are tied into 
the complete concept of every individual. But in another, 
more essential sense, I cannot assent to Mondadori’s 
position. I do not agree that the laws are tied up with the 
core principles (essence) of the individual. My 
disinclination to Mondadori’s position stems from not just 
this passage that I am about to quote but also from many 
others that are like it. Leibniz, in his correspondence with 
Arnauld states: 
                                                        
9 Mondadori, “Doctrine of Inter-world Identity,” 37. 





“Now, what is it to say that the predicate is in the subject 
if not that the concept of the predicate is found in some 
sort involved in the concept of the subject? Since from the 
very time that I began to exist it could be said of me truly 
that this or that would happen to me. What must be 
granted is that these predicates were principles involved 
in the subject or in my complete concept, which 
constitutes the so-called me, and which is the basis of the 
interconnection of all my different states.”10 
 
It would be easy to brush this off as supporting a super-
essentialist point of view. However, I would direct one’s 
attention to the beginning of the second sentence where 
Leibniz states, “Since from the very time that I began to 
exist…” It is only once Leibniz began to exist in this  
particular universe that everything that will happen to him 
was set in motion. The predicate in subject principle, the 
basis of super-essentialism, only applies once an 
individual is said properly to exist. Not before. God, in his 
infinite wisdom, surveys the infinite possibilities that can 
occur and picks out this world, this best of all possible 
worlds. Many other worlds were possible wherein 
different properties were associated with the individuals 
inserted into them. But God chose this one, with this 
group of individuals with these properties, because he 
knows all and was able to see that this world was best. 
There are many quotes from the correspondence that 
seem to support a super-essentialist interpretation of 
Leibniz, but they are all predicated on the fact that the 
individual already exists, and as such, has a complete 
concept that includes the laws of this universe that they 
were realized in. But the individuals that I am referring to 
when I assert inter-world identity are still only pure 
possibility. They do not exist and that is why they are 
                                                        
10 Leibniz, Correspondence, 113. 




capable of being inserted into any number of possible 
worlds and still remain essentially themselves. 
 
A Return to Freedom and Possibility 
Now that inter-world identity has been established, 
Leibniz’s conception of freedom as being predicated upon 
possibility is also saved. Leibniz’s freedom hinged on 
possibility and the existence of other possible worlds 
wherein different properties were associated with the 
same individual. Freedom stemmed from the fact that 
things could have been otherwise. The possibility existed 
of a world wherein Adam did not sin, or Caesar did not 
cross the Rubicon, and Judas was not damned. Therefore, 
Leibniz was entitled to what he said regarding human 
freedom because inter-world identity can be upheld. 
World-bound individuals and super- essentialism take too 
much away from Leibniz’s philosophy and do not 
sufficiently investigate the notion of complete concepts. 
This is why inter-world identity should be upheld to the 
detriment of super-essentialism. 
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